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The new Basel II Capital Accord has demanded a lot of attention from 
regulatory and regulated entities due to its innovations in determining 
capital requirements, particularly in the area of credit risk. This paper 
simulates the application of Basel II IRB foundation approach for the 
computation of total capital requirements for the coverage of credit risk of 
major Brazilian banks corporate portfolios. The IRB necessary parameters 
of probabilities of default are estimated from a scoring model that uses 
explanatory variables derived from the raw data present in the Public Credit 
Register of the Central Bank of Brazil. IRB requirements are compared with 
current Brazilian regulatory requirements. By making use of the 
CreditRisk+ portfolio model this paper shows how it is possible to extend 
the previous comparison. The main result is that, for the situation analyzed, 
the IRB approach can be considered more conservative than the current 
Brazilian prescription. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study fits within the context of the discussions of the New Basel Capital Accord, 
the well-known Basel II, promoted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
One of the main innovations of the accord compared to its previous version pertains to 
the regulation of total capital requirements for credit risk. The new accord aims to 
approximate the notions of regulatory capital and economic capital, or, in other words, 
to render regulatory capital more sensitive to the risk profile of bank credit portfolios. 
 
Basel II proposals for the regulation of credit risk comprise three approaches with 
increasing levels of complexity. At this paper we focus on the intermediary approach, 
the IRB (Internal Rating Based) foundation approach (Basel 2001), as the simplest 
approach is not likely to produce major changes in current capital requirements in Brazil 
and the more advanced one is understood to be too sophisticated for the current stage of 
development of the Brazilian banking system. In the IRB foundation approach each 
bank is required to estimate its own set of PD (probability of default) parameters 
whereas the regulatory entity provides the other inputs. The goal of this paper is to 
simulate the actual application of this approach by making use of the data present in the 
Public Credit Register (PCR) of the Central Bank of Brazil. Particularly, PCR data is 
shown to be useful in PD estimation and therefore a valuable source of information in a 
country as Brazil, where rating agencies have a very modest scope of coverage. 
  
The simulation of IRB requirements makes it possible a comparison with current 
Brazilian regulatory requirements, providing an idea of how Basel II IRB is likely to 
affect the system minimum obligations. However, a more meaningful comparison can 
be achieved by making use of a third element: a credit risk portfolio model. This issue is 
explored in the last part of this paper. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief description of the 
current Public Credit Register of the Brazilian Central Bank. We comment on the main 
features of the data and the market access to them.  Section 3 describes the current 
regulatory approach to provisioning and capital allocation in Brazil (Resolutions 2099 
and 2682 issued by the Central Bank of Brazil).    5
Section 4 initiates the modeling part of the study by deriving potentially explanatory 
variables of default from the raw data present in the Public Credit Register. Based upon 
these variables a scoring model is fitted, supplying a probability of default (PD) 
estimate for each credit exposure identified by the pair borrower-financial institution.  
 
The study then focuses on computing total capital requirements for credit risk for each 
major bank credit corporate portfolio present in the analysis. Firstly in section 5 this is 
done according to the IRB foundation approach. We calculate IRB requirements (capital 
plus provision) using the PD estimates and compare the IRB results with current 
Brazilian regulatory requirements and existing capital levels. 
 
Section 6 discusses the problems faced by practitioners when trying to apply some 
influential credit risk portfolio models to the Brazilian context and justify our choice of 
the CreditRisk+ (CR+) model in the present study. Section 7 presents the results of 
running CR+ on each bank corporate credit portfolio under the “single systemic factor 
assumption”. While section 7 compares CR+ results with current regulatory 
requirements section 8 compares the former with IRB outputs and examines further the 
fitting between the two. Section 9 concludes the paper with a summary of the main 
results and some further thoughts. 
 
 
2. The Brazilian Public Credit Register 
 
Brazil’s Public Credit Register (PCR) was established in the middle of 1997 by the 
Central Bank with the objective of enhancing banking supervision activities. The PCR 
was initially conceived to monitor the financial institutions’ credit portfolios and also 
major borrowers within the financial system. The supervision department was put in 
charge of managing the database. 
 
So far, the PCR has been able to provide key information on credit risk for supervision, 
macroeconomic policy makers and banks. It represents an important tool for credit risk 
management, and could help to reduce spreads in credit transactions.   6
In general, all financial institutions with credit portfolios are requested to provide 
information to the PCR
1. Credit exposures reported embrace loans in general, e.g. 
revolving credits, auto loans, mortgages, leases, trade finance and guarantees. 
 
The information available at the PCR is provided by financial institutions on a 
consolidated basis (by borrower and risk classification). It comprises besides the credit 
exposure itself, the risk classification and the ranges of maturity
2 and past dues. There 
are three grades of maturity: up to 180 days, from 181 to 360 days and more than 360 
days. As for past due loans, the credits are split into four ranges, according to the days 
in delay: from 15 to 60 days, from 61 to 180 days, from 181 to 360 days and more than 
360 days. 
 
The data sets are provided to the Central Bank on a monthly basis. In order to have 
access to the PCR information, a financial institution must have express authorization 
by the borrower, which can also access its own data. Even when this is the case 
financial institutions have access only to the aggregate debt of a borrower (consolidated 
throughout the financial system). The available information refers to maturity, past 
dues, write-offs and guarantees. There is also information on the number of creditors of 
a borrower within the financial system. The information on the ratings granted by 
financial institutions is not available. 
 
Banks’ consultations to the PCR’s database on credit concession processes have been 
increasing overtime, as graph 1 shows. 
                                                                  
1 Multiple banks, commercial banks, the federal savings and loans banks, investment banks, development 
banks, real state credit companies, finance companies, leasing companies and credit unions/coops (started 
providing data in April 2001). 
2 The ranges of maturity comprise the period between the reported month and the final payment of the 

































































































































Since its implementation, the PCR has undergone through several modifications. At the 
beginning, banks had to monthly report all credit exposures related to individuals or 
companies which exceeded R$ 50,000.  Later on (November 1999) the threshold was 
lowered to R$ 20,000 and finally to R$ 5,000 in January 2001
3. Lastly, since March 
2000 banks have been requested to provide the risk classifications of their credit 
exposures, according to Resolution 2682.
4  
 
As of July 2002, the total numbers of registers in the PCR was more than 7 million: 
72% related to individuals (standing for 27% of total credit exposures) and 28% related 
to companies (standing for 73% of total credit exposures).  
 
 
3. Current Regulatory Approach for Provisioning and Capital Allocation 
 
The current regulatory framework for credit risk in Brazil comprises the implementation 
of the 1988 Capital Accord through Resolution 2099 and the regulation for loan 
classification and provision, established through Resolution 2682. Resolution 2682 
provides general guidance for building an asset classification system and has been key 
in enhancing credit risk management in Brazil. 
 
                                                                  
3 US$ 1760 (July 2002) 
4 See section about Resolution 2682.   8
3.1 Resolution 2099 
 
In Brazil, the 1988 Capital Accord was introduced through the Resolution 2099, issued 
in August 1994. Later on the Resolution was amended and the current framework used 
for capital calculation is presented in a table in the appendix. The table provides also a 
comparison among the current regulation and the 1988 Accord. Although it displays 
risk weights for all classes of assets, at this paper we focus solely on capital 
requirements for bank loan portfolios. 
 
The regulatory capital (RC) currently in place in Brazil is given by the following 
expression: 
 
RC = 11%∑  RWA + Other capital requirements. 
where 
∑ RWA = sum of risk weighted assets with weights given by the table in the appendix. 
Loans have 100% risk weight and are evaluated net of provision.  
Other capital requirements = capital for credit risk of swaps + capital for interest rate 
market risk + capital for foreign exchange rate market risk. 
 
Another way to see the above requirement is through the Basel Index (I) that is 
computed by the Central Bank of Brazil as the ratio I ≡  11% ×  (Capital/RC).
5 In this 
case the requirement that capital should be larger than RC translates equivalently into 
the requirement that I ≥  11%. 
 
3.2 Resolution 2682 
 
Resolution 2682 from 1999 establishes that financial institutions should classify their 
credit exposures into nine levels of risk, according to the following grading system: AA 
(prime companies), A, B, C (normal risk – low probability of default), D (level 1 risk), 
E, F, G (level 2 risk) and H (level 3 risk – high probability of default).  
 
                                                                  
5 The capital in the computation of the Basel Index is basically defined as equity + net income + reserves 
+ preferred stocks + subordinated debt + hybrid instruments.   9
The rating process must be based on: 
 
a) Analysis of the borrower:  credit worthiness, indebtedness, capacity to generate cash 
to repay its debts, quality of earnings, quality of management and internal controls, 
punctuality, economic activity, commitments; 
 
b) Analysis of the credit transaction: the kind of transaction, the collateral provided, the 
amount of the debt. 
 
According to regulation, all exposures from a single borrower must be classified 
according to the higher risk transaction within a financial institution for provisioning, as 
well as PCR information purposes. In exceptional circumstances (e.g. liquid collaterals) 
it is allowed to consider more than one rating for a single borrower. Each rating is 
associated with a specific percentage of provision according to table 1. 
 
Table 1: Structure of Resolution 2682 
Classification AA A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H 
Provision (%)  0  0.5  1 3  10  30  50  70  100 
Past-due  (days)  -  -  15-30 31-60 61-90  91-120 121-150 151-180 >180 
 
As a general rule, ratings must be reviewed every twelve months. Ratings must also be 
reviewed every six months when the debt of the borrower or its group is higher than 5% 
of the actual existing capital. Finally, ratings must be monthly reviewed in case of non-




All documentation related to the credit risk policy and rating process of a financial 
institution must be available for Central Bank analyses.  
 
 
                                                                  
6 After six months the bank must write off the transaction graded H.   10
4. Estimating Probabilities of Default through a Credit Scoring Model 
 
In this section we estimate annual probabilities of default (PDs) for performing credit 
exposures provided by large financial institutions to corporate borrowers as of October 
2001.
7 Each credit exposure is characterized by the pair borrower-financial institution so 
that the same borrower may have different estimated PDs in different financial 
institutions but only one in each single institution. We define corporate borrowers as the 
ones having at least R$1milion of loans in any financial institution in October 2001, 
provided they do not belong to the public sector.
8 The analysis is based on the database 
of the Brazilian PCR and the data used for the estimation comprehends the corporate 
borrower registers of the period from October 2000 to October 2002. There are 39,946 




The database used in the model construction is divided in two parts. Registers relative to 
the period from October 2000 to October 2001 are used to build the explanatory 
variables of default. Continuous, discrete, dummy and categorical variables are built 
with this purpose from the PCR raw data. On the other hand, registers relative to the 
period from November 2001 to October 2002 serve to define the dependent variable 
characterizing default or non-default status. More specifically, a borrower was 
considered to be in default in a financial institution if its “mean” credit classification 
there, according to Resolution 2682, was equal or worse than “E”, in any month from 
November 2001 to October 2002.
10,11 Exposures with classification equal or worse than 




                                                                  
7 We consider only financial institutions that detain a minimum of 200 credit corporate exposures. 
8 Due to the computational limitations of the database system of the current Public Credit Register this 
study is restricted only to the universe of corporate borrowers. This is however not too restrictive in terms 
of a PD model estimation if we assume that information concerning large borrowers is generally more 
accurate than the one relative to small borrowers. 
9 After excluding exposures with missing registers. 
10 When it was the case that the borrower presented more than one classification in a certain FI its “mean” 
credit classification in the FI was computed based on the weighted average of the minimum provisioning 
percentages of the different existing credit classifications. 
11 Exposures that don’t last the whole period are recognized as defaulted or non-defaulted based solely on 
the months of their appearance. 
12 In fact approximately 90% of the exposures bellow or equal “E” in October 2001 maintain this 
classification in some month of the next year.   11
In table 2 we show a list of potentially explanatory variables of default that were 
considered for the estimation of the credit scoring model. Their construction was based 
on the suggestions by Barren & Saten (2000) and mainly on the hand-on experience of 
the supervisory departments of the Central Bank. A more detailed characterization of 
the variables is found on the appendix. 
 
Table 2: Potentially explanatory variables of default 
Variable Expected  sign 
Classification in 10/2001  + 
Worst classification  + 
First classification  + 
Average classification  + 
Frequency of up to date payments  - 
Frequency of up to date payments in the system  - 
Logarithm of total debt  Undetermined 
Logarithm of guarantees   - 
Logarithm of guarantees in the system  - 
Logarithm of the exposure  Undetermined 
Logarithm of the exposure in the system  Undetermined 
Frequency of rated credits  - 
Frequency of rated credits in the system  - 
Time since the first appearance  - 
Time since the first appearance in the system  Undetermined 
Frequency of total debt in default  + 
Frequency of total debt between D and H  + 
Frequency of total debt between B and D  Undetermined 
Frequency of total debt between B and C  Undetermined 
Dummy of delay in 10/2001  + 
Dummy of delay in 10/2001 in the system  + 
Dummy of any delay  + 
Dummy of any delay in the system  + 
Dummy of total debt increase  Undetermined 
Dummy of total debt increase in the system  + 
Dummy of write-offs increase  + 
Dummy of write-offs increase in the system  + 
Proportion of delay in 10/2001  + 
Proportion of delay in 10/2001 in the system  + 
Number of FIs  Undetermined 
Dummy of single FI  Undetermined 
Economic sector  + 
Financial conglomerate  + 
 
 
Two thirds of the exposures (26,631) are selected to constitute a sample for model 
construction (training sample) and the remaining one third (13,315) is left to comprise a 
sample for model testing (validation sample). This is done through a sequential 
sampling procedure controlled by the dependent variable characterizing default, the 
financial conglomerate provider of the credit and the total debt variable in order to   12
constitute two similar samples in relation to these characteristics. Also preceding the 
model estimation the Pearson correlation matrix of all non-categorical variables is 
computed and checked for possible problems of multicolinearity.
13 
 
The credit scoring model used is a logistic regression and the estimation is conducted 
through a backward procedure based on the likelihood ratio test. Besides the variables 
initially built we have also tested for the inclusion of interactions and the discretisation 
of variables based on the use of a tree classification routine.
14 In most cases these 
attempts resulted in no additional significant explanatory power.
 15 The backward 
procedure identified at the end 13 significant variables, which are the variables 
highlighted in the previous table.  
 
Finally, an analysis of residuals was carried out and identified three observations that 
presented high influence.
16 After their removal the model was readjusted and displayed 
the coefficients detailed in the table 3.
17 The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
test presents for this final model a statistic value of 8,3701 (p-value = 0.3982), 
indicating therefore a good level of fitting. 
                                                                  
13 Due to its high correlation with the variable proportion of total debt between B and D, the variable 
proportion of total debt between B and C is excluded in order to avoid possible problems of 
multicolinearity. 
14 The goal of this routine is to form, through the use of classification trees, groups that possess between 
them the maximum difference in the proportion of defaults. 
15 The only exception refers to the variable worst classification that was modified by the tree routine in 
order to be constituted by only four categories (AA to B as the basal class, C, D and E to H). 
16 See the D-Cook statistics graph in the appendix. 
17 With respect to the categorical variable conglomerate we display the coefficient only for one financial 
conglomerate.   13
 
Table 3: Model of default prediction 






Intercept   -4.3625  0.5510  62.8208  <.0001 
Classification in 10/2001  A  0.3236  0.0941  11.8178  0.0006 
Classification in 10/2001  B  0.6311  0.0958  43.3947  <.0001 
Classification in 10/2001  C  0.9200  0.1153  63.6227  <.0001 
Classification in 10/2001  D  1.7815  0.1326  180.4711  <.0001 
Worst classification  C  0.2434  0.093  6.8497  0.0089 
Worst classification  D  0.4768  0.1106  18.585  <.0001 
Worst classification  E-H  0.6950  0.1493  21.6555  <.0001 
Frequency of total debt in default   0.9975  0.3322  9.0163  0.0027 
Dummy of delay in 10/2001  1  0.9368  0.0864  117.6562  <.0001 
Dummy of delay in 10/2001 in the 
system 
1 0.5974  0.0709  71.0454  <.0001 
Dummy of any delay  1  0.2312  0.0856  7.2889  0.0069 
Dummy of any delay in the system  1  0.4502  0.0733  37.7064  <.0001 
Proportion of delay in 10/2001    0.4500  0.2057  4.7874  0.0287 
Proportion of delay in 10/2001 in the 
system 
 1.1413  0.1917  35.4289  <.0001 
Dummy of total debt increase in the 
system 
1 0.2674  0.065  16.9278  <.0001 
Number of FIs    0.0336  0.00574  34.3727  <.0001 
Logarithm of the exposure in the 
system 
 -0.0984  0.0148  44.4597  <.0001 
Conglomerate 2628  1.6523  0.5954  7.7007  0.0055 
￿
 
All the coefficients shown in the previous table are significant with their signs and 
relative magnitude in conformity with the expected ones.
18 To illustrate this fact take for 
instance the case of the categorical variable classification in 10/2001 which represents 
the risk classification of the exposure according to Resolution 2682 as of October 2001 
and whose basal level is defined to be “AA”, the supposedly less risky classification. 
All the coefficients of this variable are positive, as expected, indicating that risk 
classifications other than “AA” translate into higher PDs. Also as we move from “A” to 
“D” the magnitude of the coefficient increases indicating this is a path of increasing PD, 
again as expected. 
 
Two variables whose signs we had no prior expectation about appear in the final model:  
logarithm of the exposure in the system and number of FIs. Their signs indicate that the 
smaller the size of the borrower (measured by its loan portfolio in the system) and the 
greater the number of financial institutions in which it holds credits then the larger its 
probability of default is. 
                                                                  
18 At least for those variables whose effects we have a clear expectation about. See table 2.   14
It is also interesting to note that relevant characteristics of the exposures are not only 
those relative to the particular FI but also those relative to the whole financial system. 
The variables proportion of delay in 10/2001 and dummy of any delay have for example 
their analogous counterparts in the financial system also included in the final model, 
namely proportion of delay in 10/2001 in the system and dummy of any delay in the 
system (and showing larger coefficients). The variable dummy of delay in 10/2001 in 
the system is also present in the final model, now with a coefficient smaller than the one 
estimated for its counterpart variable dummy of delay in 10/2001.  
 
Lastly it is useful to pay attention to the variables that do not appear in the final model. 
Two important variables absent in the final model are the logarithm of guarantees of the 
borrower and the economic sector of the borrower, so that their effects in PD estimation 
were found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
 
5. Simulating Basel II IRB on Brazilian Data 
 
In this section we estimate IRB total capital requirements for the corporate credit 
portfolios of large financial conglomerates of the Brazilian financial system.
19,20 The 
analysis still refers to portfolios existing in October 2001 and the term corporate has the 
same meaning of the previous section. We conduct the analysis at the level of the 
financial conglomerates holders of the large FIs of the last section. The 28 so chosen 
conglomerates are hereafter referred as banks. One should note that restricting the 
analysis only to the larger institutions is consistent with the Basel proposal. In fact only 
for large banks it’s fair to assume a high degree of diversification and therefore the 
“single risk factor” assumption embedded in the IRB methodology.
21,22 
                                                                  
19 Throughout the remainder of the text, unless clearly specified otherwise, capital means a protection 
only against unexpected losses. As IRB requirements cover both unexpected and expected losses we have 
used here the expression “total capital” to convey this latter meaning. 
20  In the latest version of the Accord the Basel committee has decided to move to an unexpected loss-
only risk weighting construct. However banks will still be required to compare their actual provisions 
with expected losses and as a consequence any shortfall will be deducted from capital and any excess may 
be eligible as capital. Therefore the basic idea that “total capital” should cover both expected losses and 
unexpected losses remains the same. 
21 See Gordy (2002). 
22 The IRB assumption of an infinitely fine grained portfolio is also more appropriate in the context of 
large portfolios making the granularity adjustment a less grave problem in this case. See Basel (2001) and 
Gordy (2002).   15
 
To simulate IRB requirements we make use of the scoring model of the previous 
section. Each performing credit exposure (with classification strictly better than “E”), 
characterized by a pair borrower-financial institution, is then assigned a probability of 
default (PD) estimated by the scoring model.
23 Exposures with classification equal or 
worse than “E” in October 2001 are taken as defaulted and assigned a PD of 100%. The 
definition of default employed here is consistent with the IRB recommendation that a 
past due of more than 90 days should be an indication of default since Resolution 2682 
indeed characterizes classification “E” in this way. 
 
We follow here the IRB foundation approach as proposed by the third consultative 
paper on the new accord (Basel 2003), known as CP3. Exposure at Default (EAD) is 
defined as the sum of due and past-due credits. Guarantees are not included in EAD 
because their correct consideration would require a deeper analysis than the one that 
current PCR data can provide. A Loss Given Default (LGD) of 45% and a Maturity (M) 
of 2.5 years are taken from the CP3 standard prescriptions as there is no detailed 
information either on collateral or on maturity on the current system.
24  
 
From the PDs estimates and the values assumed for LGD and M we calculate for each 
exposure the factor of total capital requirement K according to the formulas provided in 
the CP3 document.
25 Then we multiply EAD by K and add the product over all 
exposures arriving at a total capital charge for each bank portfolio.
26 Graph 3 shows K 
as a function of PD, for a fixed LGD of 45% and a fixed M of 2.5 years, as defined by 
the IRB curve of the CP3 document. 
 
                                                                  
23 Since the actual IRB requirement is that the bank should be able to estimate a PD for each rating grade 
of its internal rating system we may say here that, for each Conglomerate, there are technically as many 
rating grades as the number of pairs borrower-financial institution. 
24 As the IRB total capital charge is linear on LGD the effect of different values of this parameter is easily 
estimated in the straightforward manner from the results stated here. 
25 See the appendix about the IRB formulae. 
26 Strictly following IRB, EAD*K should be first multiplied by 12.5 to arrive at a measure of “risk 
weighted asset” and  the sum of the weighted assets should then be multiplied by 8%. As 12.5× 8%=1 this 
doesn’t make any difference on the final figures.   16
 
IRB calibration of CP3 was designed to cover both expected and unexpected losses. 
Therefore the Brazilian regulatory measure to which IRB simulated requirements should 
be compared with is the sum of capital and provision obligations.
27 IRB requirements 
and total Brazilian regulatory requirements are plotted in graph 4 for each bank (see the 
two top lines). To get a view on how the parts constituting total regulatory obligations 
behave separately in respect to the IRB demand we also plot in the graph the regulatory 
provision requirements and their theoretical counterparts, expected losses.
28 The vertical 
distance in the graph between total regulatory requirement and provision is the 
regulatory capital requirement while the distance between the IRB line and the expected 
losses line is interpreted here as the IRB implicit capital requirement. 
 
                                                                  
27 Recall that Brazilian current capital obligation is 11% of exposures net of provision and provision 
obeys Resolution 2682 which prescripts minimum provisioning percentages according to a classification 
criteria. 
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The graph illustrates that for 15 out of the 28 banks analyzed the IRB methodology 
translates into lower total requirements than the current regulatory obligations. For the 
other group IRB is likely to increase total capital requirements. We also examine the 
relation between IRB and the current requirement aggregately for the system of the 28 
banks. Weighting each bank by the size of its portfolio we find that IRB implies slightly 
smaller requirements than those currently in place in (-0.52%) and that provisions at the 
system levels are slightly smaller than the expected losses in (-0.35%). However, more 
can be said about the relation between IRB and the Brazilian regulatory requirement by 
making use of a credit risk portfolio model, as discussed in the final part of this paper 
that initiates with the next section about credit risk models.  
 
An interesting point to note in graph 4 is that, whenever the IRB requirement is greater 
than the regulatory obligation, their difference is generally largely explained by the 
difference between expected loss and provision. On the other hand, when the IRB 
requirement is lower than the regulatory obligation, their difference is generally much 
larger than the difference between expected loss and provision, meaning that these 
lower-than-regulatory IRB values are mostly due to the IRB implicit capital 
requirements lower than regulatory capital.  
 
Another point worth examining is whether Brazilian banks are already sufficiently 
capitalized to face the new IRB requirements. The context we have in mind is a 
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situation where provision is kept regulated by Resolution 2682 but regulatory capital is 
redefined as the difference between IRB output and provision. We address the question 
of sufficient capitalization by examining the Basel Index computed for each financial 
conglomerate as described in the section about Resolution 2099. This index (with a 
slight correction) may be compared to the difference between the IRB requirement and 
the provision to indicate whether existing capital would be adequate in a post-IRB 
situation (modified Basel Index larger than IRB minus provision) or not (modified 




In graph 5 each point represents a bank present in our analysis. As most points are 
located above or approximately along the 45-degree line, the graph suggests that the 
majority of the banks will not have problems to face the new IRB capital demands. 
However, caution should be placed in such analysis since Basel Index takes into account 
regulatory capital for other risks besides the corporate credit risk and therefore the 




                                                                  
29 The correction is the multiplication of the original Index by 1 minus the mean provision to cope with 
the fact that current capital regulatory obligation is applied to amounts net of provision. 
30 The approximation is the following: 
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6. Credit Risk Models in the Brazilian Context 
 
In the past decade financial industry has sponsored several credit value-at-risk (VAR) 
methodologies. Their use in Brazil is, however, severely limited by the amount and type 
of data they require and the assumptions they make. We briefly comment below on 
some of the problems faced by practitioners when trying to apply these off-the-shelf 
models to the Brazilian context.
31 
 
  KMV, one of the first methodologies to bring accuracy to the field of credit risk 
measurement, is based on the options pricing theory and the ideas of Merton (1974). It 
is a structural approach where default is endogenous and relates to the capital structure 
of the firm. The methodology uses inputs parameters from the equity market and for this 
reason its applicability in Brazil is constrained by the inadequate liquidity of most 
corporate stocks. For example, KMV’s reliance on measures of stock volatility for 
calculating the probabilities of default represents a limit for equities that are very 
seldom traded. Therefore, while being a theoretically founded approach, its scope of 
applicability is possibly limited in Brazil only to the larger firms with trading equities. 
 
Another important methodology in the world of credit risk measurement is 
CreditMetrics, proposed by JP Morgan. This is a mark-to-market methodology that 
makes strong use of rating transition probability matrixes to calculate losses arising 
from both rating downgrades and default events. As it essentially links a set of ratings to 
different values of spread, an estimation of the credit yield curve is needed. However, 
Brazil’s secondary credit markets are very underdeveloped to provide such an estimate 
and the alternative of making an estimate based on the sovereign yield curve cannot be 
considered more than a hunch. Besides, Creditmetrics presumes the existence of a 
consistent provider of ratings with a reasonable history of rating attribution so that 
transition matrixes may be appropriately built. That is still not the case in Brazil. 
 
McKinsey also proposes its methodology named CreditPortfolioView, a multi-period 
model where default probabilities are functions of relevant macroeconomic variables. 
Transition matrixes are also used but here they possibly change over time according to 
                                                                  
31 These problems are common to many emerging countries, which share a lot of similarities with Brazil. 
See Balzarotti et. al. (2002) for a more detailed discussion.   20
the macroeconomic enviroment. Therefore a reasonable amount of data is needed on the 
chosen explanatory variables so that an appropriate structuring of the macroeconomic 
effects on the credit portfolio is made possible. However, Brazil’s various changes of 
macroeconomic regimes render the collection and use of this data an extremely hard 
task. 
 
In this paper we make use of yet another influential model, CrediRisk+, launched in 
1997 by Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). It is a model of actuarial origin and of 
default mode type.
32 Defaults follow exogenous and independent Poisson processes, 
conditionally on a set of systemic factors that are assumed to follow independent 
Gamma distributions. Besides, the functional form of the model allows an analytical 
solution so that Monte Carlo simulation is avoided.
33  Relative to others, the model’s 
data requirements are far less demanding to an environment like the Brazilian, 
characterized by a constrained universe of quoted equity and a small universe of traded 
corporate debt.
34  We show in this paper how the model may be employed using data 




A good introductory description of these four models may be found in Crouhy et. al. 
(2000). It is also good to remark that, despite their different appearances, some of the 
models possess very similar underlying mathematical structures. Gordy (2000) shows 
this is precisely the case in a comparison between CreditRisk+ and a default mode 
version of CreditMetrics. 
 
 
7. Description and Application of CreditRisk+ to Brazilian Data 
 
In CreditRisk+ (CR+) framework correlations among default events are due to common 
sensitivity to the systemic factors and all remaining credit risk is idiosyncratic to 
                                                                  
32 In other words, only default risk is modeled, not the risk of credit quality migration. 
33 An analytical solution is also good because it allows an easy computation of risk contribution measures 
although this is not the purpose of this paper. See Kurth & Tasche (2002) for an example in the CR+ 
framework. 
34 At least in its simplified version with only one systemic factor. 
35 We will note however the application is not straightforward.   21
individual credit exposures.
36 Defining the interpretation of the systemic factors and 
estimating the sensitivity of each individual exposure to each factor is not an easy task 
and generally demands considerable data.  
 
We employ here the usually called single factor assumption and interpret the effect of 
this single factor as representative of the “systemic risk” embedded in the Brazilian 
economy. This is the most conservative approach as there is no eventual benefit derived 
from diversification across factors and is consistent with IRB portfolio invariance 
property as proved in Gordy (2002).
37 A possible alternative with the data currently 
available from the PCR would be to define a small number of systemic factors as 
“orthogonal” sets of economic sectors following for instance a procedure of the kind of 
Boegelien et al. (2002) but this would enlarge very much the data requirements and is 
possibly left for future analysis. 
 
Below we formally present the model in its simplified version with a single systemic 
factor. X denotes the systemic factor and DA the indicator variable of default of 
exposure A. 
 
( ) β α , ~ Gama x  with  () 1 = = x E αβ  and  () x Var ≡ =
2 σ β   
Further, for every A,  () A A x Poisson x D ~ |  with  x PD x A A ≡  
And   x DA |  are independent 
  
The purpose of the model is to compute the probability distribution of the portfolio loss 
variable L≡∑ EADALGDADA. To achieve this goal the exposures net of recovery 
EADA× LGDA must first be discretised to small integer values, and the probabilities of 
default may also suffer some approximation to maintain expected losses unaltered. After 
that and under above assumptions it turns out that the probability generating function of 
L can be written as:
38 
 
                                                                  
36 This framework is indeed common to many default mode credit risk models. 
37 That is the property that the total capital charge on a given exposure depends only on its own 
characteristics and not on the characteristics of the portfolio in which it is held. 
38 The generating probability function of a discrete random variable L is defined as GL(z)≡ E(z
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2 , where ν A is an integer representing EADA× LGDA and 
µ A is possibly an approximation to PDA.  
 














l L ob , where l is an integer that denotes a possible outcome of 
loss. 
 
CSFP(1997) provides a recursive relation for the computation of the above derivative 
from which the probability function of the portfolio loss is calculated and an estimation 
of quantiles is thus made possible.
39 
 
Some comments are in order on the methodological choices we have made in the 
application of the model. First EAD, LGD, PD and the definition of default are the same 
as those used in the IRB simulation exercise and all considerations there also apply 
here. Next, the time horizon for which VAR is calculated is set to one year to maintain 
conformity with Basel proposal, although here we might have used other horizons that 
we believed more appropriate to the time required by a bank to reconstitute its capital. 
Yet, the 99.9% quantile is chosen for the computation of the VAR of the portfolio loss 
distributions, which is in accordance with the confidence level implicit in the CP3 risk 
weight curve. 
 
CreditRisk+ is run on each bank corporate credit portfolio in analysis. A quantile of the 
set of exposures net of recovery is used as the unit size that serves to discretise the 
exposures. A quantile of 25% that was found to be computationally convenient for the 
largest portfolios is used fixed throughout all portfolios. Although lower quantiles were 
computationally feasible for the smaller portfolios, we have still used the fixed quantile 
in those cases in order to give an uniform treatment to all banks.
40 
 
                                                                  
39 The recursive relation is in fact due to Panjer (1981). 
40 An adoption of lower values in those cases would mean artificially privileging the smaller banks since 
the discretization employed here rounds up the exposures net of recovery and therefore typically increases 
the loss distribution high quantiles.   23
From the previous presentation of the model one notices that DA, the indicator variable 
of default, theoretically a Bernoulli variable, is approximated by a Poisson distribution. 
This implicit assumption of the model, usually known as the Poisson approximation, is 
only reasonable when PDs are sufficiently small.
41 However, not all PDs generated by 
the scoring model satisfy this condition. We cope with this problem by defining a cut-
off PD value so that exposures with PDs above it are supposed to generate 
“deterministic” losses equal to their expected losses and consequently do not enter the 
CR+ recursive algorithm. These deterministic losses are added to the CR+ quantile of 
the “non-deterministic” part of the portfolio to arrive at the final quantile figure of the 
loss distribution. 
 
Previous approach is motivated by the following reasoning. If we believe that default 
rates that are high on average are likely not to be affected by the economy we may 
consider them as independent between them and from the others. Then, provided there 
are many exposures in this situation, we may say, from the law of large numbers, that 
the total loss resulting from them would not differ much from the their total expected 




A cut-off PD value of 15% is used fixed across portfolios. Approximately 9% of non-
defaulted exposures have PD higher than this value. Although the choice of the above 
cut-off value has a high degree of subjectivity, we believe our approach to treat high PD 
exposures as deterministic is preferable than using standard CR+ model without 
modifications in the sense that it is probably closer to reality.
43  
 
There is still an important input to the model that deserves comments. Parameter sigma 
(σ ) in the previous presentation is the usually called default rate volatility. Tail 
probabilities for portfolio losses are quite sensitive to the choice of its value.
44 However, 
efficiently estimating annual volatility based on just a few years of data present in the 
PCR is nearly an impossible task. Wilde (2000) suggests the default rate volatility of 
                                                                  
41 So that terms of degree 2 and higher in the default probabilities can be ignored. 
42 We thank Tom Wilde for suggesting the interpretation of the deterministic approach employed here. 
43 However, further exploration of this issue is left for future analysis. 
 
44 See Gordy (2001)   24
100% as part of a robust implementation of the model. At the same time, international 
estimates of this parameter typically apply to rated firms and therefore the suitableness 
of these estimates for a country like Brazil is controversial.
45 Therefore here the model 
is run for values of the default rate volatility varying from 20% to 130% in order to 
provide an idea of the sensitivity of the results.
46 In graph 6 we illustrate the effect of 
different values of the parameter on the form of the portfolio loss distribution of a 
particular bank. We note that tail probabilities increase substantially as we increase 
sigma. 
 
Graph 6: Probability Function Estimates 
 
CreditRisk+ and total regulatory requirements (capital plus provision) are depicted in 
graph 7 for each bank corporate portfolio in analysis. The graph emphasizes once again 
that increases in the default rate volatility parameter lead to higher CR+ requirements.  
We show results for volatilities equal to 50%, 80% and 100%. A default rate volatility 
of 50% is the highest value of the parameter from those tested where current regulatory 
requirements still exceed or are very close to CR+ requirements for all banks. 
Increasing volatility to 60% and 70% starts making regulatory requirements look 
                                                                  
45 See Balzarotti et. al. (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the possibilities of estimating default rate 
volatility in the case of Argentina. 








































































Sigma = 80%  25
deficient for some banks. With default rate volatility set to 80% we find 6 banks having 
CR+ estimated requirements violating the upper regulatory limit. With default rate 
volatility equal to 100% regulatory requirements become still more clearly inadequate.   
 


















8. Comparing IRB and CR+ Requirements 
 
Now we turn to a comparison between IRB and CR+ requirements. First, interpreting 
CR+ outputs as proxies to economic requirements we follow an analysis similar to the 
previous one between IRB and current regulatory requirements. Here we find that a 
default rate volatility of 90% is the highest value of the parameter from those tested so 
that CR+ requirements are still below or very close to their IRB counterparts for all 
banks. With volatility set to 100% we find 4 banks having CR+ quantiles superior to 
their IRB obligations. With volatility equal to 110% IRB requirements are still more 
clearly yet deficient from a regulatory perspective. This analysis is illustrated in graph 
8. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
46 We have run the model only for volatilities multiple of 10%.   26
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Another kind of analysis is possible when both IRB and CR+ outputs are interpreted as 
regulatory requirements. A primary concern here is the fitting of the CR+ requirements 
to the IRB outputs for the corporate Brazilian data of October 2001. Following a 
suggestion developed by Balzarotti et. al. (2003) we address this issue by running linear 
regressions across the 28 banks, with constant set to zero, of the CR+ quantiles against 
the IRB requirements. A different regression is estimated for each value of the volatility 
parameter. For all values of the volatility we find uncentered R-squared generally 
extremely high - around 0.98. However, a volatility of 110% is clearly the one that 
produces the best adjustment in the sense of having the pairs (IRB,CR+) closer to the 
45-degree line. The estimated coefficient in this case is 0.992 and the Wald statistic for 
null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to the unity is 0.1166 with p-value of 0.733. 
For all other values tested for the volatility default rate the above null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% confidence level. 
   27
The above analysis is illustrated in graph 9 where each point represents a bank. CR+ 
outputs are graphed against their IRB counterparts for the selected volatility value of 
110% and the estimated regression line is shown too. 
 
 
Other choices for the default rate volatility translate into other values for the estimated 
coefficient of the regression according to table 4. Based on that table one can propose a 
recalibration of the IRB risk weight curve through its multiplication by a factor equal to 
estimated regression coefficient correspondent to the default volatility he has in mind. 
For instance the inclusion of a multiplicative factor of 0.92 in the IRB formulae is 













Nevertheless it should be pointed out, as stated in Balzarotti et. al. (2003), that given the 
non-linearities involved in credit risk modeling the previous linear regression approach 
is not theoretically founded. Our choice of a linear adjustment should be mainly 








































At this paper we have illustrated, based on PD estimates, on information about EAD and 
on some other assumptions, how PCR information can lead to estimations of bank 
capital and provision requirements. While simulating IRB requirements under the 
foundation approach has been found to be a more direct task due to its simple and 
closed package nature, computing CR+ requirements has demanded some subjective 
choices and reasoning to cope with its recursive nature and its distributional 
assumptions. In those two both approaches PD estimates played the role of important 
input parameters and PCR showed its usefulness once again by providing the raw data 
that was used to build the explanatory variables of default.  
 
For the time period analyzed we have shown that the IRB requirements completely 
support the performance of corporate credit portfolios for a annual default rate volatility 
up to 90% while current regulatory requirements accomplish the same achievement only 
in the case of default volatilities up to 50%. In this way our data suggest that, for the 
time period analyzed and for the corporate portfolios, the IRB approach can be thought 
to be more conservative than Brazilian regulatory requirements. That does not mean, 
however, that the IRB requirements are always higher than their current regulatory 
counterparts. In fact this paper shows that this is the case for approximately only half of 
the banks analyzed, the opposite being true for the other group. This paper also shows 
that the actual existing capital of each bank at the period of analysis are sufficient to 
cover the new IRB demands for the majority of the banks analyzed. Finally, this paper 
presents a methodology of recalibration of the IRB risk weight curve based on the CR+ 
model. 
 
At the same time some caution is needed when interpreting the results of this paper. 
First, the focus of this paper is exclusively on credit risk of the bank corporate portfolios 
and, therefore, the total capital requirements computed throughout the text are just the 
parcels needed to cover this risk. We do not deal with the requirements relative to the 
credit risk of the other segments of the credit portfolios neither with the relation 
between credit risk and market risk. Second, the time period used for the analysis 
(October 2000 to October 2002) comprehends a period where Brazilian currency has 
experienced a large devaluation due to a number of external and internal factors. The   29
requirement figures shown in this study reflect the environment of that time and, 
therefore, should not be directly transposed into today’s much different macroeconomic 
conditions.  
 
Finally, it is important to remark that, as the Brazilian Central Bank moves to a new 
Public Credit Register framework, with a larger scope of information gathering and a 
more accessible technology infrastructure, a richer set of studies concerning credit risk 
measurement is made possible. Not only better estimates of PD, EAD, LGD and M 
become feasible but also the collection and management of the large sets of data is 
rendered a far less laborious task. For instance, with the new PCR fully in activity, 
expanding this paper to entail also the bank retail credit portfolios should present no 
significant data management difficulties.   30
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Appendix 
 
I. Risk Weights in the Current Brazilian Regulation and the 1988 Accord 
 
 
  Basel 1988 Accord  Current Brazilian Regulation 
0% 
(a) Cash 
(b)  Claims on central governments and central banks 
denominated in national currency and funded in that currency 
 
(c) Other claims on OECD central governments and central 
banks 
 
(d) Claims collateralized by cash of OECD central-government 
securities or guaranteed by OECD central governments 
(a) Cash 
 
(b) Claims on central government 
and central 
bank denominated and funded in 
national currency 
 
(c) Claims collateralised by cash of 
central-government securities or 
guaranteed by central government 
20% 
(a) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IADB, 
AsDB, AfDB, EIB) and claims guaranteed by, or collateralised 
by securities issued by such banks 
 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD 
and loans guaranteed by OECD incorporated banks 
 
(c) Claims on banks incorporated in countries 
outside the OECD with a residual maturity of up to one year and 
loans with a residual maturity of up to one year guaranteed by 
banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD 
 
(d) Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, 
excluding central government, and loans guaranteed by such 
entities 
 
(e) Cash items in process of collection 
(a) Investments in gold 
 
(b) Deposits and investments abroad 
in foreign currency 
 
(c) Cash items in process of 
collection 
50% 
(a) Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that 
is or will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented 
(a) Claims on banks 
 
(b) Loans fully secured by mortgage 
on residential property 
 
(c) Interbank foreign exchange 
 
(d) Claims on states and 
municipalities for their government 
securities   33
  Basel 1988 Accord  Current Brazilian Regulation 
100% 
(a) Claims on the private sector 
 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a 
residual maturity of over one year 
 
(c) Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless 
denominated in national 
currency - and funded in that currency) 
 
(d) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public 
sector  
 
(e) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
 
(f) Real estate and other investments (including non-
consolidated  investment participations in other companies) 
 
(g) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted 
from capital) 
 
(h) all other assets banks (unless deducted from capital) 




(c) Premises, plant and equipment 
and other fixed assets 
 
(d) Real estate and other 
investments (including non-
consolidated investment 
participations in other companies) 
 
(e) all other assets 
300% 
  (a) Tax credit 
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II. Description of the potentially explanatory variables for default 
 
•   Classification in 10/2001. Ordinal categorical variable that represents the risk classification 
attributed by the FI to each borrower according to Resolution 2682 of the Central Bank of Brazil.
47 
This variable is decomposed in 4 dummies, each one representing the classifications “A”, “B”, “C” 
or “D” and we take “AA” as the basal grade. Classifications equal or worse than “E” do not show up 
in this framework since exposures within this classification range were excluded from the data used 
in the estimation for being considered already defaulted.  
 
•   Worst classification. Worst risk classification obtained by the borrower in the FI within the period 
from October 2000 to October 2001. Similarly to the previous variable this one is decomposed in 3 
dummies, representing the risk classifications “C”, ”D” and the classification range “E” to “H”. 
48 
We take the interval “AA” to “B” as the basal grade. 
 
•   First classification. First risk classification obtained by the borrower in the FI within the period from 
October 2000 to October 2001. This variable is decomposed in 8 dummies, each one representing a 
classification from “A” to “H” and we take “AA” as the basal grade. 
 
•   Average classification. Average risk classification of the borrower in the FI within the period from 
October 2000 to October 2001. This timely average classification is computed in the same way as the 
within-month average classification and is decomposed similarly to the variable first classification.  
 
•   Frequency of up to date payments. Number of months in which the borrower presents neither past 




•   Frequency of up to date payments in the system. Number of months in which the borrower 
presents neither past due credits nor write-offs in the system divided by the number of months the 
borrower has credits in some FI.
51  
 
•   Logarithm of total debt. Logarithm of the total debt of the borrower in the system in October 2001.  
 
                                                                  
47 For the construction of the variables relative to risk classification it is assumed that each borrower presents only 
one risk classification within each FI. When that is not the case we assign the borrower a “mean” risk classification as 
described in a previous footnote. 
48 That categorization has been suggested by the tree classification routine.  
49 We use the expression “the borrower has credits in the FI” to mean the borrower has strictly positive total debt in 
the FI. 
50 It is important to have in mind that the variables that are built based on data along time comprise information only 
relative to the period from October 2000 to October 2001. In the case of the variable frequency of up to date 
payments for instance the months analyzed are constrained to this period. 
51 All the variables are computed based on the restricted database of this study, namely, the one composed by credit 
exposures provided by financial institutions with at least 200 exposures of borrowers who have at least R$1million in 
some institution. Consequently the term system should technically convey this precise meaning.   35
•   Logarithm of guarantees. Logarithm of the guarantees of the borrower in the FI in October 2001.  
 
•   Logarithm of guarantees in the system. Logarithm of the guarantees of the borrower in the system 
in October 2001.  
 
•   Logarithm of the exposure. Logarithm of the sum of due and past due credits of the borrower in the 
FI in October 2001. 
 
•   Logarithm of the exposure in the system. Logarithm of the sum of due and past due credits of the 
borrower in the system in October 2001. 
 
•   Frequency of rated credits. Number of months in which the borrower possesses due credits, past 
due credits or guarantees in the FI divided by the number of months the borrower has credits in the 
FI. A low frequency indicates a high proportion of months in which the borrower presents just write-
offs in the institution, therefore a negative sign is expected.  
 
•   Frequency of rated credits in the system. Number of months in which the borrower possesses due 
credits, past due credits or guarantees in the FI divided by the number of months the borrower has 
credits in some FI. Negative sign again expected.  
 
•   Time since the first appearance. Number of months since the first month the borrower has credits 
in the FI up to October 2001. This variable may be interpreted as a proxy for the time of the 
relationship between the borrower and the institution and therefore a negative sign is expected. 
 
•   Time since the first appearance in the system.  Number of months since the first month the 
borrower has credits in some FI up to October 2001. Now the previous interpretation doesn’t apply 
and the sign of the coefficient is undetermined.  
 
•   Frequency of total debt in default. Sum of the total debts relative to the months in which the 
borrower presents classification between E and H in the FI divided by the sum of total debts of all 
months the borrower has credits in the FI.  
 
•   Frequency of total debt between D and H.  Similar to the previous variable with the exception that 
here we consider the classification range between D and H.  
 
•   Frequency of total debt between B and D. Similar to the previous variable with the exception that 
here we consider the classification range between B and D.  
 
•   Frequency of total debt between B and C. Similar to the previous variable with the exception that 
here we consider the classification range between B and C.   36
•   Dummy of delay in 10/2001. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower possesses past due credits or 
write-offs in the FI in October 2001 and assumes 0 otherwise.  
 
•   Dummy of delay in 10/2001 in the system. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower possesses past 
due credits or write-offs in any FI in October 2001 and assumes 0 otherwise.  
 
•   Dummy of any delay. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower possesses an exposure (past due 
credits + write-offs) higher than 10% of its total debt in the FI in any month and assumes 0 otherwise.  
 
•   Dummy of any delay in the system. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower possesses an exposure 
in the system (past due credits + write-offs) higher than 10% of its system total debt in any month 
and assumes 0 otherwise. 
 
•   Dummy of total debt increase. The variable assumes 1 if the increase in the borrower total debt in 
the FI within the period from October 2000 to October 2001 is superior to 100% and assumes 0 
otherwise. 
 
•   Dummy of total debt increase in the system. The variable assumes 1 if the increase in the borrower 
total debt in the system within the period from October 2000 to October 2001 is superior to 100% 
and assumes 0 otherwise. 
 
•   Dummy of write-offs increase. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower presents write-offs in the FI 
in October 2001 larger than in the first month the borrower has credits in the FI and assumes 0 
otherwise.   
 
•   Dummy of write-offs increase in the system. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower presents write-
offs in the system in October 2001 larger than in the first month the borrower has credits in some FI 
and assumes 0 otherwise.   
 
•   Proportion of delay in 10/2001. Sum of past due credits and write-offs of the borrower in the FI 
divided by the borrower’s total debt in the FI, in October 2001. 
 
•   Proportion of delay in 10/2001 in the system. Sum of past due credits and write-offs of the 
borrower in the system divided by the borrower’s total debt in the system, in October 2001. 
 
•   Number of FIs. Number of financial institutions in which the borrower has credits in October 2001.  
 
•   Dummy of single FI. The variable assumes 1 if the borrower has credits in only one FI in October 
2001 and assumes 0 otherwise.   37
•   Economic sector. Categorical variable representing the economic sector in which the borrower 
belongs. It is decomposed in 22 dummies, one for each economic sector. The basal group is taken to 
be a group with one of the lowest proportions of defaults and therefore a positive sign is expected.  
 
•   Financial conglomerate. Categorical variable representing the financial conglomerate in which the 
FI holder of the exposure belongs. It is decomposed in several dummies, one for each conglomerate. 
The basal conglomerate is taken to a conglomerate with one of the lowest proportions of defaults and 
therefore a positive sign is expected.   38
III. Graph of D-Cook statistics of the residuals 
   39
IV. IRB formulae as in the CP3 Document 
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Risk-weighted asset (RW) = K ×  12.5 ×  EAD 
 
The parameters above are computed for each credit exposure separately. N(.) denotes 
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution and N
-1 denotes 
its inverse. Based upon the previous calculation a final total capital charge for the credit 
portfolio is achieved as: 
 
Capital Charge =  ∑ ×
A
A RW % 8  where the sum is over all credit exposures. 
 
Under the foundation approach of the IRB methodology LGD is fixed on 45% and M on 
2.5 years so that there is only need to input the parameters PDA and EADA for each 
credit exposure A of the credit portfolio. 
 
For a full description of the version of the IRB methodology used in this study see Basel 
(2003).   40
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